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sure. Id. at 472. 
Chief Judge Murphy wrote the 
opinion for the court of appeals. In 
deciding the first issue, the court first 
gathered a working background in the 
plain meaning of the term "bodily 
injury" as written in the policy de-
scription. It acknowledged that with-
out a finding of" bodily injury," cov-
erage would not be triggered. The 
court found that" [w]hile the defini-
tion of bodily injury includes sickness 
and disease . . . the definition also 
specifically includes injury to the body 
.... " Mitchell, 595 A.2d at 475-76 
(quoting Insurance Co. of N. Am. v. 
Forty-Eight Insulations, 451 F .Supp. 
1230, 1242 (E.D. Mich. 1978), aff'd, 
633 F.2d 1212 (6th Cir. 1980) (em-
phasis in original». The court also 
found authority that most jurisdictions 
have defined "bodily injury" to in-
clude any " localized abnormal condi-
tion." Mitchell, 595 A.2d at 476. The 
court also looked to Black's Law Dic-
tionary 159 (5th ed. 1979), which 
stated that "bodily injury . . . 
[g]enerally refers only to injury to the 
body, or to ... diseases contracted by 
the injured as a result of injury." Id. 
These findings illustrated that because 
a distinction existed between the oc-
currence of " bodily injury" and the 
resulting manifestation of sickness or 
disease, the terminology" sickness or 
disease" did not determine when an 
injury took place, but only that some 
injury did exist. Id. The question of 
"when" was an issue for medical 
experts. 
Consequently, the court of ap-
peals next looked to the affidavits of 
the medical experts, Craighead and 
Epstein. Id. The court noted that they 
were in general agreement as to their 
findings, except as to the initial inci-
dence of "bodily injury." Id. The 
court took an interest in the particular 
field of each expert, just as the Su-
preme Court of Illinois did in Zurich 
Ins. Co. v. Raymark Indus., 514 
N.E.2d 150 (Ill. 1987). 
The court recognized that the is-
sue presented in Zurich was identical 
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to the one presented before the court in 
Mitchell. Mitchell, 595 A.2d at 476. 
Nine physicians testified extensively, 
and there was disagreement between 
the pathologists and the clinicians as 
to when an injury occurred in asbestos 
cases. The clinicians conceded that 
damage might occur upon inhalation, 
but they also noted that the lung is 
capable of repairing itself so that not 
every inhalation precipitates disease. 
Id. at 477 (citing Zurich, 514 N.E.2d 
at 156). Without symptoms, they 
argued, it would be impossible to 
determine with accuracy exactly when 
a disease began. Therefore, it should 
follow that a disease would have to be 
diagnosed by its symptoms before it 
could constitute a " bodily injury." Id. 
This argument, however, did not sway 
the Illinois court which concluded that 
once asbestos fibers are inhaled, bodily 
injury occurs, and nothing within the 
insurance policy requires diagnosis 
nor does it require identification of 
that injury within the policy period. 
Simply stated, only the injury must 
take place within the policy coverage, 
not the subsequently-manifested dis-
ease. Id. 
Extending this analysis, the Mary-
land Court of Appeals noted that mere 
exposure to asbestos without injury 
does not trigger coverage. Id. at 478. 
However, upon the diagnosis of a 
disease, the courts will look back to 
the time of initial exposure to deter-
mine when the bodily injury occurred. 
Id. 
In this writer's opinion, an inter-
esting situation would have arisen if a 
person had been diagnosed under the 
insured's valid policy. When looking 
retroactively to the point of bodily 
injury, however, the initial inhalation 
of asbestos predated the policy cover-
age. It is unclear whether coverage 
would be allowed even if the insured 
product clearly aggravated an other-
wise pre-existing asbestos-related mild 
lung condition. Technically, no in-
jury actually" occurred" as defined by 
the Maryland Casualty policy. Also, 
if the process to develop lung disease 
from asbestos is not immediate, it 
would appear to be very difficult, if 
not impossible, to decipher which 
inhalation precipitated the disease, i.e., 
was it the asbestos in his own home, a 
neighbors home, at work, etc. It would 
seem that unless actual initial causa-
tion could be shown, coverage would 
not be triggered. 
The significance of Mitchell v. 
Maryland Casualty Co. rests with its 
possible application to other disease 
related cases where exposure to a 
condition is relevant, such as AIDS or 
Hepatitis B in hospitals and other 
facilities dealing with blood. For 
now, Maryland's stance on asbestos-
related insurance coverage is to be 
determined from the moment of initial 
exposure, so long as a disease mani-
fests itself as a result. This is a policy 
which protects both consumers and 
installers from unknown dangers which 
we may not yet have the technology to 
detect. It places the burden tempo-
rarily upon insurance companies who 
can best afford the risk of using new 
materials and devices, and in turn, 
through their own influence, can pres-
sure the manufacturers to work harder 
to safeguard the public. 
- Kenneth Goldsmith 
Cohen v. Cowles Media Co.: 
FIRST AMENDMENT DOES 
NOT PROIDBIT AN INFOR-
MANT FROM RECOVERING 
DAMAGES UNDER STATE'S 
PROMISSORY ESTOPPEL LAW 
FOR NEWSPAPER'S BREACH 
OF PROMISE OF CONFIDENTI-
ALITY. 
In Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., 
111 S. Ct. 2513 (1991), the United 
States Supreme Court held that the 
First Amendment does not prohibit an 
informant from recovering damages 
under a state's generally applicable 
promissory estoppel law for a 
newspaper's breach of a promise of 
confidentiality given in exchange for 
information. The Court based its 
decision on the theory that laws of 
general applicability are not offensive 
to the First Amendment merely be-
cause their enforcement has incidental 
effects on a newspaper's ability to 
gather and report the news. In so 
ruling, the Court distinguished the 
facts of this case from those in Smith 
v. Daily Mail Publishing Co., 443 
U.S. 97 (1979), where the court held 
that there could be no cause of action 
against a newspaper for publishing 
lawfully obtained and truthful infor-
mation about a matter of public sig-
nificance, absent state interest of the 
highest order. 
In 1982, Dan Cohen ("Cohen") 
approached reporters from two news-
papers owned by respondent, Cowles 
Media Company. Cohen, a Republi-
can campaign worker in Minnesota, 
offered the reporters disparaging in-
formation concerning the Democratic 
candidate for Lieutenant Governor in 
return for a promise of confidential-
ity. The reporters took the informa-
tion and agreed to keep Cohen's iden-
tity a secret. The two newspapers 
subsequently decided to include 
Cohen's name in their stories and to 
identify him as the source of their 
information. Cohen was fired the 
same day the stories appeared. 
Cohen filed suit against the news-
papers in Minnesota state court, alleg-
ing fraudulent misrepresentation and 
breach of contract. Respondents ar-
gued that the First Amendment barred 
recovery. A jury returned a verdict in 
Cohen's favor and awarded him both 
compensatory and punitive damages. 
The Minnesota Court of Appeals up-
held the trial court's award of com-
pensatory damages, but reversed the 
award of punitive damages on the 
basis that Cohen had not established a 
cause of action for fraudulent misrep-
resentation. The Minnesota Supreme 
Court reversed the compensatory dam-
age award, but went on to consider 
whether Cohen could recover under 
promissory estoppel, a theory which 
had not been advanced by either party 
at trial or on appeal. The court 
concluded that enforcement of the 
promise of confidentiality under a covery under a state's promissory es-
promissory estoppel theory would vio- toppel doctrine in cases where a prom-
late defendants' First Amendment iseof confidentiality had been broken. 
rights. The United States Supreme Respondents argued that under Smith 
Court granted certiorari in order to v. Daily Mail Publishing Co., 443 
consider the First Amendment impli- U.S. 97, 103 (1979), state officials 
cations of the case. could not punish a news organization 
The Supreme Court began its analy- for publication of lawfully obtained, 
sis by rejecting respondents' argu- truthful information of public signifi-
ments for dismissal based on a lack of cance, absent a need to further a state 
subject matter jurisdiction. The Court interest of the highest order. Cohen, 
concluded that, although the promis- 111 S. Ct. at 2518. The majority of 
sory estoppel theory had not been the Court agreed that while this propo-
presented by the parties in the courts sition was "unexceptionable," Smith 
below, the Minnesota Supreme Court was distinguishable from the case at 
had created a federal question by con- bar as it dealt with state-imposed limi-
sidering and deciding its applicability tations on what could be published, 
in relation to federal law . Cohen, 111 not self-imposed limitations arising 
S. Ct. at 2517 (citing Orr v. Orr, 440 out of an agreement. Cohen, 111 S. 
U.S. 268, 274-75 (1979». In addi- Ct. at 2518-19. In addition, the Court 
tion, the Court noted that respondents questioned the "lawfulness" of ob-
had themselves relied upon the protec- taining information by means of prom-
tions of the First Amendment as a ises which are later broken. [d. at 
defense in the lower courts. Cohen, 2519. 
111 S. Ct. at 2517. The Court cited several cases which 
The Court then turned to the ques- held that generally applicable laws do 
tion of whether First Amendment pro- not offend the First Amendment sim-
tections could be triggered by a pri- ply because their enforcement against 
vate cause of action for promissory the press has incidental effects on its 
estoppel. Recognizing that in order to ability to gather and report the news. 
do so, a private cause of action must [d. at 2518. The Court expressed 
constitute "state action" within the "little doubt" that Minnesota's doc-
meaning of the Fourteenth Amend- trine of promissory estoppel was a law 
ment, the Court looked to such cases of general applicability, and that en-
as New York TImes Co. v. Sullivan, forcement of such a law against the 
376 U.S. 254 (1964). The Court press should not have been subject to 
concl uded that" the application of state stricter scrutiny than if it were en-
rules oflaw in state courts in a manner forced against other persons or orga-
alleged to restrict First Amendment nizations within the state. [d. at 2518-
freedoms constitutes 'state action' 19. Accordingly, the judgment of the 
under the Fourteenth Amendment." Minnesota Supreme Court was re-
Cohen, 111 S. Ct. at 2517. Address- versed,andthecasewasremandedfor 
ing promissory estoppel in particular, further proceedings on the issue of 
the Court reasoned that because the whether Cohen had established a prom-
state law doctrine of promissory es- issory estoppel claim under Minne-
toppel created obligations never ex- sota law. 
plicitly assumed by the parties, it was In one oftwo dissenting opinions, 
necessary for the courts of that state to Justice Blackmun, who was joined by 
enforce such obligations, which con- Justices Marshall and Souter, argued 
stituted "state action" for purposes of that the majority was misguided in 
the Fourteenth Amendment. [d. at their reliance upon cases such as As-
2518. sociatedPressv. NLRB, 301 U.S. 103 
The Court next considered whether (1937), and Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 
the First Amendment precluded re- U.S. 665 (1972), because these cases 
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did not involve the imposition of li-
ability based upon the content of 
speech. Cohen, 111 S. Ct. at 2520-21. 
Drawing instead upon Hustler Maga-
zine v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46 (1988), 
Justice Blackmun argued that in those 
cases where imposition of liability 
was based upon the content of speech, 
the state's interest in protecting its 
citizens had been found insufficient to 
remove such expressions from First 
Amendment protection. Cohen, 111 
S. Ct. at 2521. The Minnesota Su-
preme Court decision made it clear, he 
concluded, that the state's interest in 
enforcing its promissory estoppel doc-
trine was far from compelling. Id. at 
2522. 
Justice Souter, in a dissent joined 
by Justices Marshall, Blackmun, and 
O'Connor, argued that the case did 
not fall within the lineof cases cited by 
the majority which held the press to 
laws of general applicability. Id. He 
instead suggested compliance with the 
Court's methodology in earlier cases 
such as Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 
485 U.S. 46 (1988), where it was 
found necessary to " articulate, mea-
sure, and compare the competing in-
terests involved in any given case to 
determine the legitimacy of burdening 
constitutional interests .... " Cohen, 
111 S. Ct. at 2522. According to 
Justice Souter, the public interest in 
being better informed and thus more 
prudently self-governed was para-
mount to the state's interest in enforc-
ing a newspaper's promise of confi-
dentiality. He admitted, however, 
that were Cohen's identity of less 
public concern, liability might not be 
constitutionally prohibited. Id. at 
2523. 
The Supreme Court's holding in 
Cohen will undoubtedly affect how 
reporters deal with their informants. 
Newspapers now have legal incen-
tives to not disclose the identity of a 
confidential source, even when that 
person's identity is itself newsworthy. 
More importantly, this decision dem-
onstrates the Court's reluctance to 
expand the boundaries of the news 
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media's First Amendment privileges. 
- Jason Shapiro 
Baltimore Sun Co. v. Colbert: 
COURTROOM CWSURE 
PRESUMPTIVELY VIOLATIVE 
OF FIRST AND FOURTEENTH 
AMENDMENTS ABSENT SPE-
CIFIC FINDINGS SHOWING 
PREJUDICE TOWARDS 
DEFENDANT. 
In Baltimore Sun Co. v. Colbert, 
593 A.2d 224 (Md. 1991), the Court 
of Appeals of Maryland held that the 
public and media cannot be excluded 
from a preliminary criminal hearing 
without first being provided with an 
opportunity to argue against such clo-
sure. The court further held that all 
findings of fact supporting the court-
room closure and the sealing of the 
transcript must be made on the record. 
Tyrone Michael Colbert was in-
dicted for first degree murder and 
other related criminal charges. The 
State notified the defendant of its 
intention to seek the death penalty or 
alternatively, life without parole. Prior 
to trial, Colbert filed a motion to 
enforce a prior plea bargain agree-
ment with the State. 
At the hearing on the motion, 
Colbert requested that the hearing be 
closed to the public. The State ob-
jected to the closure because of the 
public's right to know about the sub-
ject matter. Nevertheless, the trial 
court held that the defendant's rights 
to a fair trial outweighed the public's 
right to be present at the hearing. A 
reporter for the Baltimore Sun Com-
pany ("Sun") also objected to the 
closure. The Sun reporter argued the 
paper had a constitutional and com-
mon law right to attend the hearings. 
The court stated that it would re-open 
the hearing when counsel for the Sun 
arrived. The court then ordered ex-
clusion of everyone from the hearing, 
except for the parties and counsel. 
Counsel for the Sun was unable to 
gain immediate access to the hearing, 
but when counsel was allowed into the 
courtroom, the judge refused to re-
open the hearing. Counsel for the Sun 
then requested that the nature of the 
hearing be disclosed and the records 
of the proceedings be provided. When 
counsel's requests were denied, the 
Sun appealed the ruling, arguing that 
it had a constitutional and common 
law right to attend pretrial hearings 
and to examine pleadings. Id. at 227. 
The Court of Appeals of Maryland 
granted certiorari prior to consider-
ation by the court of special appeals to 
determine two questions. . 
The court first addressed the issue 
of whether prior notice of a courtroom 
closure during a pretrial proceed ing in 
a criminal case is required and whether 
an opportunity to oppose such closure 
is required. Second, the court deter-
mined whether the lower court vio-
lated the First and Fourteenth Amend-
ments to the United States Constitu-
tion and Article 40 of the Maryland 
Declaration of Rights in its hearing 
and sealing of the closure motion. Id. 
at 226. 
The court began its analysis by 
stating that there is a general presump-
tion of openness in criminal trial pro-
ceedings as guaranteed by the First 
and Fourteenth Amendments to the 
United States Constitution. Id. at 227 
(citing Richmond Newspapers Inc. v. 
Virginia, 448 U.S. 555,573 (1980)). 
In concluding that the trial court erred 
in the present case, the court of ap-
peals relied on a two-prong test devel-
oped in Press-Enterprise Co. v. Supe-
riorCourt, 478U.S.1 (1986). Colbert, 
593 A.2d at 228. The court stated the 
test as first, "whether the place and 
process have historically been open to 
the press and general public[,J" and 
second, " whether public access plays 
a significant positive role in the func-
tioning of the particular process in 
question." Id. (quoting Press Enter-
prise, 478 U.S. at 8). Applying Press 
Enterprise, the court recognized that 
if the two-prong test is satisfied, there 
is a qualified right of access to a 
judicial pretrial proceeding, based on 
the First and Fourteenth Amendments 
